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This chapter examines the issue of differential treatment in contemporary Turkey,
with an emphasis on the merits and limits of the rule and exemption approach in
local context. I will survey the Turkish scene for requests for exemption from the
law (EFL) and subsequent responses by state institutions – identifying, in the
process, a significant mismatch between requests and responses, indicating 
that historically there has been little space in the Turkish polity to accommodate
the range of EFL requests. However, recent signals indicate changes in this trend
since Turkey attained European Union (EU) candidate status in 1999.
The main argument of this essay is that the above mismatch reflects a chasm
between the dominant conception of Turkey as a ‘modern’ state, which emphasises
solidarity, unity and secularity, and the development of a civic society, whose
‘post-modern’ demands for recognition and accommodation are grounded in
religious, philosophical and ethnic markers.1 The modernist Turkish state is
premised on an understanding of nation as a people within a territory making up a
community of citizens (with rights) and a community of sentiments (based on
common bonds). Nationhood, in this sense, ‘involves a high level of cohesion that
binds nation and state together’ (Jackson and Sorenson 2007: 271). During the
twentieth century, Turkish elites adopted a modernising mythology premised upon
the superiority of Western (Enlightenment) values. They believed that only strong
states could promote economic and political development, and ‘this could be
undermined if religion, ethnicity, or caste dominated politics.’2 However, the
modernist perspective has created its own discontents, so much so that some have
termed the twentieth century the ‘last modern century’ (Katzenstein 2006: 31). In
the post-modern conception of politics, it is argued that ‘collective identities are
projected away from the nation and no longer linked to socio-political cohesion
or the strength of the state’ (Jackson and Sorenson 2007: 273). This perspective
thus opens up the possibility of ‘multiple modernities’, or ‘multiple ways of being
modern appropriate to the different cultural and religious traditions’ (Thomas
2005: 45).
The Turkish experience with regard to the issue of differential treatment is of
significance for the future of the EU project. For one, the Turkish case represents
a rare phenomenon of a secular political system within the Muslim world with
ramifications on the issue of differential treatment. This is of particular significance
in cases where the Islamic doctrine and secular values come into conflict. Similarly,
the main problem for European Islam is its rejection of the public–private dis-
tinction that is now firmly enshrined in European law and practice (Katzenstein
2006: 13). This fundamental issue is often boxed into a debate of Muslim excep-
tionality in multicultural Europe.3 The Turkish case provides an opportunity for
the analyst to tackle this vital issue – how to synthesise democratic and Islamic
values more generally – on its full merits.
Muslim integration into Europe is becoming an increasingly salient issue. As dis-
cussed elsewhere, ‘western Europe has become increasingly secular’ (Katzenstein
2006: 14) while the Muslim communities in Europe have become increasingly
assertive in claiming exemptions on religious grounds (Meer and Modood 2009).
Indeed, ‘in the immediate future, questions about the status and treatment of 
Muslim communities in Europe might have the strongest potential to activate
religion as a basis of competitive mobilisation and claims-making’ (Nexon 2006:
281). Debates over this issue ‘have the potential to be quite disruptive, as they
immensely complicate bargaining over law, authority, and any more mundane
policy issues that they implicate’ (Nexon 2006: 281). This chapter argues that, while
an analysis of the Turkish experience since the 1920s does not offer all the answers,
it does provide a century-old ‘laboratory’ for examining Islamic-versus-secular
debates within the EU.
The following pages are organised around several key questions. What kinds of
requests for differential treatment are made in Turkey? What are their rationales?
How are they expressed? What are the general characteristics of Turkish state
responses? What historical and political factors shape these responses? How, if at
all, has the EU process influenced the state’s responses? Can we observe changing
state responses to the requests for differential treatment in specific cases? And,
finally, what can we conclude from the implications of possible change in Turkey
for the broader issue of constituting a European ethos?
A typology of Turkish practice
A survey of the Turkish scene indicates that requests for exemption from law may
take various forms, including conscientious objection, and group or individual
exemption from legal obligation.4 Though each case could be classified under a
certain form of request for differential treatment, it often reaches beyond one form.
It would not be an overstatement to say that conscientious objection constitutes
the bedrock of the demands for differential treatment in Turkey, often coupled
with civil disobedience or request for exemption from legal obligation. For
instance, the request for exemption from the dress code in public institutions
contains elements of all three categories of request.5
We could analyse the cases of requests for differential treatment on the basis of
three main cleavages in Turkey. The first group of cases revolve around the
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cleavages between religion (Sunni Islam) and the secular (Turkish) state. Examples
of this group include the request for exemption from the dress codes in public
institutions (including schools) and the right of female doctors not to examine male
patients. A second group of requests for exemption from law pits the state-recog-
nised Sunni doctrine against members of the minority Alevi sect of Islam. The
main complaint in this regard is that the law makes religious education compulsory
for primary- and secondary-school students from which Alevi families want 
to exempt their children. Contrary to the first two groups of the requests, a third
group of the requests involves individual exemptions from law, such as freedom
from military conscription.6 In this case of individual conscientious objection, the
claimants typically invoke secular/universal values – such as anti-militarism –
rather than religious/particular ones.
The Turkish state’s response to these requests for differential treatment has 
been quite rigid. The state does not back away from the official principle of
universal application of the law, because it views differential treatment as a sign 
of weakening state authority. Several factors play a role in this particular percep-
tion of the Turkish state. For one, the Turkish state in some ways is still going 
through the nation-building process, with a heavy emphasis on the unity of the
state and homogeneity of the society. This leaves little room for a more nuanced
approach to demands for exemption from law. Second, the Turkish state sees the
issue of religion in a distinct manner. On the one hand, it officially aspires to keep
religion separate from the political process. On the other hand, it seeks to control
the religious life of the country through the Directorate for Religious Affairs
(DRA) under the Prime Ministry with the aim of curbing religious extremism. 
As we discuss later, this rather awkward position complicates and leads to a
stalemate in the way the Turkish state approaches religion-based demands for
exemption from law. Third, Turkish political and social traditions place the
interests of the state and society-at-large above those of the group or individual
(see Ahmad 1996).
The interface between requests for differential treatment and the response 
of Turkish institutions generates several important issues for analysis. As the
majority of the cases involve religion-based conscientious objection, the rule 
and exemption discussions usually revolve around cleavages of the state versus
religion. In addition, group rights versus order and individual rights versus order
are important points of tension. As discussed above, what cuts across all of these
issues is the modern conception of the Turkish state as a unitary and secular entity,
as opposed to the more recent post-modern, multicultural conception of the Turkish
polity. This impasse has been further complicated by Turkey’s post-1999 EU
accession process. EU requirements, especially the Copenhagen political criteria –
with their emphasis on plurality, individual and group rights and tolerance for
minority requests – have strained the modernist outlook of the Turkish state.
In the next section, I will provide a brief overview of the historical and political
legacy of the rule and exemption approach in Turkey. I will discuss both the
enduring and changing aspects of this system since the country began the EU
accession process at the end of the 1990s.
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Historical and political background
The history of  modern Turkey begins with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire
in the wake of the First World War. The Ottoman state resembled contemporary
multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multicultural empires (see Lewis 1961). It had Islam
as its official religion but recognised the rights of non-Muslim minorities in its 
so-called millet (nation) system. The largest ‘nation’ was of Muslim faith, with this
being treated as a whole (without taking ethnic and sectarian differences into
consideration). The non-Muslim minorities included mainly Armenian, Greek and
Jewish ‘nations’, who had more specific rights, such as the right to have their own
schools (including religion-based institutions), to train clergy, to instruct in their
own languages and to practise their religious duties (see Oran 2004: 61–81).
While certain elements of the Ottoman legacy continued to survive under the
new republic, many were abolished or marginalised. A radical departure from the
Ottoman Islamic past was the adoption of the principle of secularism (laicism) as
one of the main pillars of the modern Turkish state. As a result, two important
policies emerged: a strict separation of religious affairs from state affairs; and the
foundation of the DRA to safeguard against religious reactionary movements and
to regulate the religious life of the Muslims in line with Sunni doctrine (Oehring
2002: 8). The overall marginalisation of the Islamic identity by the republic faced
resistance from religious conservatives who felt politically isolated and threatened.
These sentiments never amounted to a full-blown resistance movement but led to
sporadic episodes of resistance in those more traditional areas of the country that
were strongly influenced by religious brotherhoods (Mardin 1977: 279–97).
As part of the overall secularisation drive, a new national education system was
set up to replace the religious one. Education was unified under the Ministry of
National Education, with the aim of bringing not only modernisation but also
secularisation to the schools. Schools educating religious clergy were kept separate
from regular schools. Like the educational system, the legal system was also freed
from its previous basis, and Western secular laws were adopted. For example, a
new Civil Law was fashioned after the Swiss Civil Code. These new laws and the
philosophy behind them brought radical social reforms to the country. Among
them were women’s rights and equality of men and women before the law. The
reform of the dress code encouraged Western-style clothing and prohibited the
wearing of religious clothing such as the veil. The wearing of all types of clothing
with religious significance was banned in state institutions (Berkes 1998).
However, the republic did not fully discard the policies of the Ottoman era. For
one, it continued to assume the homogeneity of the Muslim millet in the country.
This has led to two main areas of tension in the country. One, it perpetuated the
ignorance of the distinct Alevi sect with its proclaimed differences from the
majority Sunni sect. This prepared the grounds for claims of discrimination against
Alevis in later decades. Second, it has also led to the non-recognition of the
Muslim ethnic minorities, the most significant of whom were the Kurds. Several
Kurdish rebellions, often with conservative religious colours, took place in the
1920s and 1930s.
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In line with contemporary trends elsewhere, in the interwar years the new regime
launched a nation-building process that downplayed the issues of religious/
sectarian/ethnic identities and ‘securitised’ its approach to demands for religious/
sectarian and ethnic rights. Overt expression of these identities was seen as
anathema to ‘national unity’ – viewed as essential for survival in the crisis-ridden
regional and international systems of the period. It was only after the transition to
multi-party politics in 1946 that the voicing of demands for recognition of various
identities began to emerge more clearly.
The Cold War years shifted attention away from identity claims towards
ideological claims. Sunni religious sentiments found their expression in the policy
positions of the far right and – in some measure – the centre-right. Kurdish
demands for ethnic recognition and Alevi demands for religious rights, on the
other hand, became embedded into the overall rhetoric of the Turkish left. As the
ideological rivalries subsided at the end of the Cold War, these identity claims 
re-emerged. Among them, Kurdish sentiments dominated the Turkish political
scene. Conflicts with Kurdish groups culminated with a bloody armed rebellion
led by the separatist Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) with the demand of a separate
Kurdish state carved out of eastern Turkey. The earlier denial of the distinct
Kurdish identity was left behind in the past decade due, in part, to the reforms
conditioned by Turkey’s EU process. In recent years, the Kurdish separatist
demands seem to have died down, as the group increasingly focuses its efforts on
improving cultural rights within Turkey. (Since the Kurdish demands amount to 
a significant transformation of the political system, as opposed to requests for
exemption from a limited number of legal obligations, this paper does not deal
with this issue – but see Barkey and Fuller 1998.)
In the post-Cold War period, demands for differential treatment became the new
norm. What is relatively novel in this period is that the international community,
including European institutions and countries, began to place much more emphasis
on human-rights norms and closely monitored their implementation. Though one
can recall earlier efforts (such as the Council of Europe and the Helsinki Act of
1975) to formalise human rights in Europe, the EU’s Maastricht Treaty, which
established the Copenhagen political criteria as essential principles for accession
into the EU, has set the tone of European politics on diversity since the early
1990s. The Copenhagen political criteria require candidate countries to ensure the
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities. These elements are substantiated through
various practical mechanisms, including the rulings of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and the common recommendations of the Council of
Europe. In this new environment, the rigid Turkish state attitude towards requests
for differential treatment have come into direct contact with the more flexible and
pluralistic European norms, putting the former under scrutiny and forcing a certain
degree of change, i.e. Europeanisation.7
After the EU Helsinki Council Summit of December 1999 offered Turkey the
status of a candidate state, the EU process became the major driver of changing
policies in Turkey on cultural diversity issues. The EU, in its Accession Partnership
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Documents (APD) for Turkey, has outlined its expectations from Turkey on
cultural diversity and pluralism. The EU has examined ongoing developments 
and provided a score card of the reforms in Turkey in yearly progress reports. In
all of these documents, the EU has called on Turkey to recognise, and show greater
tolerance for the expression of, various religious, ethnic and individual identities.
There were sweeping reforms in Turkey, especially in the area of human rights,
between 2001 and 2004. In this period, nine constitutional reform packages and
many legal changes were enacted into law (Ozbudun 2007: 179–96). Consequently,
since the Progress Report of 2004, the EU has officially considered Turkey a
country that has met the Copenhagen political criteria. It was on the basis of this
report that the EU and Turkey commenced full membership negotiations in
October 2005.
These reforms either directly or indirectly expanded the political space for
requests for differential treatment to be aired. The primary issue was the official
recognition of various ethnic identities in Turkey, including both the Kurds and
other non-Muslim minority groups. The reforms also strengthened the freedom of
expression and freedom of association judicial reforms, thus enabling formerly
restricted groups to more freely express their demands and requests from the state.
Most of the issues that this chapter deals with came to the political discourse in
the country thanks to these reforms. The claimants utilised this new space, often
invoking the EU process and the acquis to support their claims (Yavuz 2006).
Despite the dynamism of Turkey’s ‘European’ era in terms of human rights,
demands at the individual level for exemptions from the law did not occupy a
significant place in the national discourse. This has begun to change gradually in
recent years. Nowadays, one sees high-profile public discussions on individual-
level requests for legal exemptions, such as objection to military conscription.
These individual-level demands are generally grounded in rhetoric about
individual conscience and universal secular values, such as the values of dignity,
and ethical convictions against militarism.
The following section aims to represent a broad range of identity-based claims
– religious, secular, group and individual – through analysis of three specific cases:
the headscarf issue (religion versus state), compulsory religion course for Alevis
(sect versus state/religion), and the right to object to military conscription (indi-
vidual versus the state). In each case, there have been encouraging developments
towards a more satisfactory balance between requests and responses, as well as
towards the resolution of certain cleavages in Turkey.
Requests on religious grounds: exemptions from dress codes
and religion courses
Demands for exemption from law on religious grounds and state responses to these
demands have been at the core of many Turkish public debates in the past two
decades. The debates themselves have been dominated by the issue of religious
symbols in the public square, especially of the Islamic headscarf in universities,
and, to a lesser extent, the demands of the Alevi for official recognition.
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In the 1990s, enthusiasm for Islamic symbols was on the rise. Since coming to
power in November 2002, the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party
(JDP) government has expressed sympathy with, and even encouraged, stronger
Islamic symbolism in public sphere. The issue became more salient after the JDP
won the general election by a landslide in July 2007 and showed signs of catering
more insistently to its religious conservative supporters. In this context, there was
an attempt in the early months of 2008 by the current JDP Government to modify
the law in order to allow female students to wear the headscarf in universities. This
was denied by the Constitutional Court, an earlier decision of which to the same
effect had been endorsed by the ECHR.
The majority of the Turkish people are in favour of lifting the ban on head-
scarves in universities on religious and human-rights grounds.8 Naturally, the
religious clergy has participated in these discussions. Traditionally, a majority of
theologians have argued that the wearing of the headscarf is an obligation for
Muslim female believers. Some NGOs regard the headscarf ban as discriminatory
against women and mostly as a violation of their freedom of religion and expres-
sion. They argue that men who share the same ideologies or beliefs do not face
the same criticisms. Additionally, men are not being subjected to litigation since
they do not wear any overt religious attire.9
The response of state institutions towards the question of allowing headscarves
in the public sphere has been based on different narratives of the issue under
consideration. Turkey has specific laws and rules governing religious symbols in the
workplace, according to which use of religious symbols by employees of the public
sector is strictly forbidden at work. The legal thinking behind this prohibition 
is reflected in the Preamble to the Constitution, which states that ‘as required by
the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred
religious feelings in state affairs and politics.’ Based on this premise, the Turkish
state has opted for a strict interpretation of its norms in a way that excludes religion
from public workplaces, including schools and universities. The wearing of the
headscarf by public employees (in the workplace) has thus been interpreted as a
display of political and pro-Islamic attitudes. The state does not see the headscarf 
as a case of religious freedom but as a political symbol of Islamism. As Skach
argues, the Islamic headscarf is no longer simply considered a religious symbol but
is increasingly perceived as a political symbol that presents a clear and present
threat to public order or to the liberty of others (Skatch 2006: 186–95).
There are also important societal segments that support the ban on the premise
that it is a matter neither of religious nor human rights but of religious oppression
of women and an assault on the secular, modern character of the regime. In
addition, there are several influential theologists who argue that the veiling of the
body parts is not a binding obligation of Islam. Their position is that in order to be
a believer of Islam one has to fulfil five religious obligations, which do not include
veiling or wearing a headscarf. They indicate that the veiling of women exists as
an obligation in the Qur’an but an ancillary one compared to the main religious
duties, such as praying and fasting. On this basis, they claim that the state may
apply its own rules and regulations, and that according to Islamic law, the state
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has the discretionary power to decide what is permissible. Thus, they suggest 
that, as the wearing of the headscarf is not a primary pillar of conviction, the 
rules imposed by the state should not be considered contrary to the religion (see
Figlali 1999). In short, they argue that in Islam the state order has priority over
individuals’ interpretations of religion.
The preceding analysis indicates that the state institutions have held their
staunch position on the headscarf issue in universities. However, in recent years,
this attitude is changing, and more change is on the way if a number of hurdles
are overcome. First, the request must be limited to universities (i.e. excluding
female public servants and high-school students). On the state side, the institutional
consensus has disappeared; the Higher Education Council gave a green light to
wearing the headscarf in universities while the Constitutional Court annulled a law
that allowed the headscarf in universities. It is clear that each new appointment 
to the Court by the President will bring the Court closer to lifting the ban. Thus, it
is highly likely that the dress-code requirements for female university students will
be changed to allow the wearing of headscarves rather than granting them exemp-
tions from the legal requirement. Alternatively, this could also be interpreted as
exempting universities from other public squares.
Positive signals are also emerging in connection with the other important tension
point in Turkish polity: Alevi demands from the Turkish state. There is the
potential to bring this issue to a resolution that is satisfactory to both state and
society. The Alevi community seems closer to official recognition than ever
before. There are an estimated 7–10 million Alevis in Turkey. They are considered
to be a sect of Shi’a Islam but one which also incorporates some pre-Islamic
elements. The Turkish state identifies the Alevis as heterodox Muslims, although
some elements of the Sunni community consider the Alevis to be a heretical
offshoot of Islam (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
2007: 10). As a Muslim group, the Alevis do not benefit from the rights accorded
to some categories of non-Muslims by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The 1982
Constitution, prepared under the aegis of the military government, reversed the
earlier policy of parental choice and made a course on ‘religious culture and moral
education’ (designed along the lines of Sunni doctrine) mandatory for all primary-
and secondary-school students in the country (Article 24). The Alevi community
has considered this policy to be an assault on its religious identity and culture by
the dominant Sunni doctrine. Alevis have demanded either an overhaul of the
standard textbook used in the course to include satisfactory information on
Alevism or a change in the law to make the course optional.
The state response to these requests for differential treatment has been mixed.
The religion course is still mandatory for all children (except those of non-Muslim
faiths). The DRA resisted the suggestion that Alevism is a distinct branch of Islam
to be recognised, making reference to differing classifications of Alevism by Alevi
scholars and followers themselves. But there have been some government efforts
in recent years to include more complete information on Alevism in the course
textbook. For instance, a committee led by a prominent Alevi theologian has been
set up to implement such a mandate.
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This trend towards meeting the Alevi request for differential treatment must 
be considered in its legal context. In response to an Alevi family’s application to
the ECHR complaining about the mandatory course on religion, the Court held
unanimously, in October 2007, that there had been a violation of ‘the right to
education’.10 The Court also took note of the Government’s acknowledgement 
that these classes do not take into account the religious diversity that prevails in
Turkish society; it decided that the religious instruction syllabus did not meet the
criteria of objectivity and pluralism necessary in a democratic society; and it ruled
that there was no appropriate method to ensure respect for parents’ convictions.
Consequently, the Court held that Turkey should bring its educational system and
domestic legislation into conformity with the ECHR. The Court judgement still
has to be implemented. In August 2008, the Alevi Federation applied to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe complaining that this decision
had not yet been implemented. In August 2008, in two separate cases, the Council
of State decided that the children of Alevi families were entitled to be exempted
from religion-education classes. Recent EU progress reports on Turkey have given
this issue considerable importance and have succeeded in putting it on the
country’s political agenda.
There have been positive signs in recent years that a consensus is emerging
among the major parties in the Turkish parliament to resolve this and other prob-
lems facing the Alevi community. The developments in this area indicate that 
the Turkish state and public attitudes toward Alevism are changing. Either the law
may change or Alevi pupils get their exemption from the course or Alevism gets
its fair share in the curriculum.
The closure of religion-based cleavages in Turkey will serve as an important
transmission belt for the further maturation of Turkish political system and will
pave the way for greater multiculturalism in the country. These recent changes
also signal a lessening of the mismatch between requests for exemption from the
law and the response of state institutions. Although just as significant in terms of
the maturation of the system, individual, secular-based claims in Turkey have not
enjoyed the strength that the religion-based claims have had. The next section deals
briefly with one such request (exemption from conscription) and examines the
slow evolution of the state’s responses to this type of request.
Requests on secular grounds: exemption from conscription
There is a European consensus on the institutional response to the request for
exemption from military conscription. Forty-five out of forty-six members of the
Council of Europe found a solution by offering alternatives to military service. Due
to this strong consensus, the Turkish practice of military conscription seems
unsustainable. The concept of conscientious objection to military conscription
became significant in Turkey during the 1990s. Though it has never become a large-
scale phenomenon, certain objectors to military conscription and their treatment 
in the legal system have drawn public attention. They have stressed that their act 
is based on their individual conscience and that they do not have to explain it to the
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state authorities. Contrary to some of the other national experiences, Turkish
objectors have based their request for exemption from law solely on secular values,
including anti-militarist political persuasion and philosophies of passivism or
anarchism. Some of them see mandatory military service for each male citizen of
the country as an assault on their human rights and argue that the law must be
changed to make such service voluntary. Others argue that those who want exemp-
tion from the conscription must be offered alternative ways of performing civilian
public service by the state. Still others, the so-called ‘total objectors’, reject both
military service as well as compensation through civilian public service.
The response of Turkish institutions to calls for exemption from military service
has evolved over time. According to the Constitution (Article 74), ‘public service
is the right and duty of each citizen.’ The courts have generally ruled that the
concept of conscientious objection is unavailable in the Turkish system. On 
the other hand, international agreements to which Turkey is a signatory stipulate
that those who consciously object to military service can be required to perform
alternative public services instead. The Turkish Penal Code (Article 155) had
considered conscientious objection to military service as ‘an act of discouraging
people from military service’ punishable as a terror-related offence. But after 1993,
a military court ruled that, since international agreements that Turkey has signed
treat conscientious objection as a right, it therefore cannot be considered as an
offence. Today, if the objector is already in the military, he is charged for
‘insistence on disobeying an order’ with a sentence of between six months and
five years in prison.11
Objection to the military draft will draw more support as the armed conflict with
the PKK gives way to a political solution to the problem. Currently, the number 
of objectors is relatively small (about eighty men). Therefore, it does not feature as
a major issue within Turkish public discourse or between Turkey and the EU. But
it does reflect how the Turkish state approaches the issue of individual exemption
requests.
Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the prevailing approach to rule and exemption in Turkey
and focused on the issues of differential treatment for the purpose of understand-
ing the extent to which the country has evolved towards a more pluralistic set of
values. We have discussed three main cases of requests for exemption from law.
In choosing them, we have tried to ensure that the cases are related to both
religion-based and secular value claims. We have also aimed to include requests
for exemption from law that are typically presented by groups or individuals. Thus,
we have explored the cases of the headscarf in the workplace, Alevi requests for
exemption from religion courses and the right to reject military conscription.
Reflecting on this discussion, our first observation is on the timing of the
demands for differential treatment in Turkey. Despite being heir to a multi-ethnic,
multi-religious and multicultural concept of statehood, from the 1920s on, the
republican regime prioritised the nation-building process, which led to a dismissal
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of claims for differential treatment. This modernist outlook implied that requests
for exemption were unpatriotic, mostly ‘irrational’ and anti-modern. The Turkish
state adopted a paternalistic approach towards society, the individual, religion and
ethics. In this sense, at the end of the Cold War, the burgeoning set of requests 
for exemption from the rule signalled the dawn of a new era for the country.
Indeed, these requests, largely of a post-modern nature, received meaningful public
attention only in the past two decades.
This leads us to another observation: despite its initially rigid responses to the
new and/or renewed demands for differential treatment, the state seems to have
gone through a learning curve, as manifested by the relatively more flexible and
consultative attitude of some state institutions, especially in the 2000s. What
accounts for this slow yet significant change? For one, the maturation of Turkish
civil society in the post-Cold War era has counterbalanced the overwhelming
dominance of the state in the public sphere. Second, the globalisation process has
opened up new avenues for the introduction of new ideas and approaches to both
state and society.
Third, and as a vital complement to these other factors, the Europeanisation
process that accelerated in the 2000s has reshaped the cleavages between state and
society, state and individual and society and individual. As expected, this process
of change in the political and legal spheres increased the flexibility of both the
state and society in dealing with various requests for differential treatment.
Overall, we could state that current public discourse on the issues of plurality is
profoundly shaped by demands of non-state and ‘minority’ actors.
What are the preliminary implications of the Turkish case for the construction
of a European ethos? The Turkish experience indicates that if there is, by and large,
a consensus in Europe on how the state institutions should respond to a particular
type of request for differential treatment, pressures build up on the divergent cases
to change in a harmonising direction. The case of the increasingly positive stance
of the Turkish state towards Alevi demands is a case in point, as the Council of
Europe decisions and EU pressures were of vital importance for the change in 
the making. Yet, a European consensus is not enough if the national exigencies
are strongly against the European trend. The case of the military draft illustrates
this situation. The armed struggle with the PKK from the mid-1980s made such
requests look unpatriotic and opportunist. Against the wider lack of a European
consensus on how to reply to a particular type of request for differential treatment,
the Turkish state’s response seems to be protracted. The case of religious symbols
illustrates this situation.
It should be also noted that analysis of the Turkish case seems to be valuable for
the construction of a shared European ethos, if the latter is taken as requiring a
degree of consolidation of the commitment to human rights in response to religion-
based requests emanating from highly conservative Muslim elements in Europe.
For, however issues of differential treatment are viewed or resolved, it is likely
that certain such demands – particularly concerning the status of women and the
headscarf question – will be considered in breach of European (or universal)
human-rights norms.
Modernist responses to post-modern demands? 109
Notes
1 For the concepts of modernity and post-modernity, see for example, Jackson and
Sorenson (2007).
2 For the Third World elites more generally, see Thomas (2005: 41).
3 For such a debate in the British context, see Meer and Modood (2009: 481–3).
4 This paper follows the definition of conscientious objection by Decker and Fresa: ‘an act
of disobedience of law, justified by a “conflict of conscience” between compliance with
the law and observance of inmost ethical convictions’ (Decker and Fresa 2001: 380). It
considers legal obligation as ‘[respecting] the state’s legal authority to make and to
enforce laws and policies’ (DeLue 1989: 1). Thus, request for exemption from legal
obligation is to mean a release from some legal obligation or requirement, especially
where others are not so released.
5 There have been occasional illegal public demonstrations at the gates of universities
since the late 1980s.
6 Of course, these cases are not exhaustive. For the purpose of brevity, I only take the
most significant ones within the past decade.
7 There is a growing literature on the mechanism of Europeanisation. They generally
argue that the higher the degree of ‘misfit’ between the national and European norms is,
the deeper the degree of Europeanisation required will be. See for example, Featherstone
and Radelli (2003).
8 According to a country-wide survey in September 2007, 73 per cent of respondents
favoured a lifting of the headscarf ban in universities. See <http://forum.vatan.tc/
basortusu-arastirmasi-kamuoyu-yoklamasi-t12444.0.html> (accessed 31 July 2009).
9 See, for example, the position of the Human Rights Foundation on this point at
<http://ihd.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=960:basorunu-
ve-kesel-tutumlar&catid=48:tutum-belgeleri&Itemid=126> (accessed 31 July 2009).
10 Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
11 Military Penal Code, Articles 87 and 88.
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